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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Historically, the great majority of businesses in this industry have been small, and locally (often 
family) owned. Sometimes a skilled machinist leaves one firm to set up a new one, with a small bank loan 
and help from family savings. Some of these locally-owned companies are incorporated, for tax purposes, 
but the mode of management is essentially the same: personal (even paternalistic) and usually relatively 
informal. 
All across the United States, during the late 1960s, there was a wave of conglomerate acquisitions of 
precisely the most successful of these previously independent or small corporate operations. Giants like 
Gulf+Western, Textron, Genesco, Litton and a hundred others sent buyers into areas like New England and 
made offers that those small business owners could not refuse. Every sector of the economy was 
affected: not only metalworking, but also apparel, shoes, department stores, hotels. In the years following 
the acquisition, a definite pattern emerged. 
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The machining of metal parts and products, 
and especially the design and production of 
machine tools, forms the core of every truly de-
veloped economy in the world. Along with the 
capacity to generate power for driving machin-
ery and electronic equipment, the ability to man-
ufacture and repair machinery is the single most 
important source of new productivity and the key 
to economic growth. No wonder, then, that every 
nation on earth is constantly trying to attract 
metalworking investment or to develop its own 
metalworking industry. 
Metalworking machinery has historically been 
of the utmost importance to the New England re-
gion, ever since the Colonial era. Over the last 
quarter-century, this industry was the fifteenth 
most important employer in the region in terms 
of jobs, out of nearly 300 industries for which 
data are available (including hospitals, schools, 
insurance companies, and even computers). 
Moreover—again on the average since the late 
1950s—while New England has had only about 
l/20th of the country's population, about one 
out of every six metalworking machinery jobs 
has been located here. It may not be as fashion-
able as computers and biological research, but 
metalworking is clearly very important to the 
New England economy's overall economic 
health. 
To workers and their local governments, there 
are substantial benefits from having access to 
jobs in this industry. The work involves a great 
deal of skill, without requiring a lot of paper 
academic credentials. This makes it particularly 
attractive for mayors and other local government 
officials who are concerned about employment 
for people in their communities who haven't been 
to college. Moreover, the industry generally pays 
good wages and significant tax revenues—actu-
ally much better than many "high tech" com-
panies. That is beneficial to local merchants, as 
well as to the city tax collector. 
Conglomerate acquisition of 
metalworking machine shops 
Historically, the great majority of businesses in 
this industry have been small, and locally (often 
family) owned. Sometimes a skilled machinist 
leaves one firm to set up a new one, with a small 
bank loan and help from family savings. Some of 
these locally-owned companies are incorporated, 
for tax purposes, but the mode of management is 
essentially the same: personal (even paternalistic) 
and usually relatively informal. 
All across the United States, during the late 
1960s, there was a wave of conglomerate acquisi-
tions of precisely the most successful of these pre-
viously independent or small corporate opera-
tions. Giants like Gulf+Western, Textron, Gen-
esco, Litton and a hundred others sent buyers in-
to areas like New England and made offers that 
those small business owners could not refuse. 
Every sector of the economy was affected: not 
only metalworking, but also apparel, shoes, de-
partment stores, hotels. In the years following 
the acquisition, a definite pattern emerged. Re-
search conducted at M.I.T., Harvard, Cornell, 
and by the staffs of at least two U.S. Congres-
sional committees reveals the following patterns: 
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conglomerate disinvestment 
• instead of reinvesting the new subsidiary's 
profits back into the business, the conglomerate 
headquarters commonly siphons them off for 
their own use, such as reallocation to other busi-
nesses in the corporate ''family'' or into finan-
cing still other acquisitions. In the trade, this is 
called "milking the cash cow." 
• the conglomerate refuses to upgrade the 
(often) old plant. 
• central management is unwilling to purchase 
new, up-to-date machinery and equipment in ad-
equate volume. 
• the old machinery is "milked," too, by re-
ducing the frequency of maintenance. 
• one hedge against erratic and shifting mar-
kets in a highly competitive industry is to main-
tain a diversified product line: a few standard 
big-selling items and the capacity to continually 
produce various special items on demand. Con-
glomerate managers sometimes run down their 
subsidiaries by eroding their capacity to produce 
these ''specials." This results from cutting down 
the engineering department or driving away the 
local firm's most experienced sales people. 
• conglomerate managers have a disturbing 
tendency to ignore the importance of in-plant 
training to build up the skills of the younger 
workers in the shop. 
• the home office either interferes excessively 
in the activities of local plant managers who do 
know the business (and the local area) well or, 
more commonly, sends in new managers who, al-
though they have a lot of discretionary power, do 
not know the local conditions very well (and who 
sometimes don't know much about the business 
in general, having been transferred from some 
totally unrelated industry). 
The bottom line is that businesses which were 
acquired in the conglomerate waves of the past 
fifteen years have shown an unusually high 
probability of becoming so weak and uncom-
petitive that they must eventually be shut down 
altogether. 
What has been the record of conglomerate 
management in the metalworking industry in 
New England? Let us contrast it with the per-
formance of the non-conglomerate shops in the 
region. During the 1970s, because of the fall-off 
of Vietnam-related procurement and a huge 
world-wide recession in 1975, the metalworking 
machine shops in this part of the country all had 
a difficult time. There were a lot of plant clos-
ings. Among the non-conglomerate shops, for 
every 100 new jobs they managed to create be-
tween 1969 and 1967 through a new start-up— 
and at least 300 new shops did open during these 
years—about 140 jobs were destroyed through 
shutdowns. 
Contrast this with the record of the shops that 
had been acquired by national and multinational 
conglomerates. Over the same time period, for 
every 100 new jobs created by a conglomerate-
held metalworking machine shop opening some-
where in New England, 460 jobs in existing shops 
were destroyed through shutdowns. In other 
words, conglomerates in this region have tended 
to shut down over four and a half times as many 
jobs as they create through new start-ups. 
In theory, conglomerates have tremendous 
capital resources. They can afford to draw from 
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their fastest-growing subsidiaries to subsidize 
losses in particular lines during tough years, to 
finance investment in new plant and equipment 
and thereby help to restore the subsidiary's abil-
ity to compete more productively when market 
conditions improve. But these extraordinary 
giant corporations also have the power to do the 
opposite: to literally bleed an acquired business 
of its capital in order to maximize the parent 
firm's short-term (in fact, ninety-day) profits and 
protect the careers of its senior managers, whose 
promotions and perks depend on how much cash 
their policies have generated in the most recent 
accounting period. 
The situation at Morse 
Because of my own previous extensive research 
into private corporate investment behavior in the 
United States and especially in New England*, 
United Electrical Workers Local 277 asked me to 
review the consulting report of the Industrial Co-
operative Association, to see whether a pattern 
might be identified here that could assist the 
union in predicting what might happen to Morse 
Cutting Tools. 
There does indeed appear to be a pattern to the 
policies of Gulf+Western with respect to its 
management of Morse. Given what we have 
learned about conglomerate investment and 
management behavior in general, there seems to 
be strong evidence that G+W has been behaving 
similarly, disinvesting in Morse for a number of 
years, thereby making it harder for the company 
to compete for new business or even to hold onto 
the customers it already has. It is not within my 
competence to predict whether G+W is literally 
planning a shutdown here, or whether shutdown 
is simply an increasingly likely outcome of a long 
series of bad management decisions. Either way, 
if there is not a significant change in the policies 
by which this company is managed, the odds 
seem very high that, sooner or later, the com-
munity of New Bedford is going to lose this 
plant, with its roughly 700 jobs. The fact that 
Gulf+Western has just hired Arthur D. Little, 
Inc., the international consulting firm based in 
Cambridge, to (among other things) develop a 
plan for moving some of the Morse product line 
to another location, reinforces my worst fears. 
This forecast is based upon six findings from 
the ICA report, and from discussions with sever-
al workers from the plant: 
(1) Gulf+Western acquired Morse in 1968, at 
a time when military procurement and a booming 
general economy were making this particular in-
dustry very profitable. In that context, Morse 
was a likely candidate for the role of cash cow—a 
business to be acquired and subsequently milked 
for its cash flow, rather than because of a desire 
by G + W to break permanently into the 
machine took industry. This, of course, is only 
an informed guess. 
(2) At the time of the purchase, Morse had 
been actively considering moving to a new plant 
in the New Bedford industrial park. The city had 
offered financial assistance. Newspapers at the 
time reported that the company strongly believed 
it needed the space. The old two-building com-
plex was relatively inefficient. Nevertheless, after 
it acquired Morse, G+W apparently decided not 
to go ahead with the construction of a new plant. 
Now management claims that Mdrse's plant is 
"suboptimal." 
(3) Over the four year period 1977-1980, the 
metalworking machine industry-wide level of 
new capital investment in the country as a whole 
for a plant about the size of Morse was 
$5,464,000. In other words, that's how much 
the average company spent on new plant and 
equipment over those four years. Morse itself 
was allowed to spend only about $766,000 over 
five years (1977-1981) on new equipment. (More-
over, some $250,000 worth of those machines, 
once purchased, were moved out and sent to 
another G+W plant out of state.) ICA was un-
able to learn whether and how much the local 
management of Morse invested in fixing up the 
plant, but casual inspection and discussions with 
the union suggest that it could not possibly have 
been as much as $5 million. It would have had to 
be that much to bring the total up to just the in-
dustry-wide average. Since most of the shops in 
the industry do not have multi-billion-dollar 
parent firms on which to draw for financial 
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assistance, this comparative record of Morse 
seems especially weak. The sense that G+W is 
under-investing in Morse is reinforced by ICA's 
comparison to one of Morse's Massachusetts 
competitors, Union Twist Drill of Athol, a com-
pany of similar size which produces a roughly 
similar mix of products. Over the past several 
years, UTD appears to have spent well over $1.5 
million on new machines and parts for the Athol 
plant: easily three times as much as the net new 
equipment investment at Morse. 
(4) the union reports that equipment mainten-
ance schedules have indeed been cut back by man-
agement. 
(5) the versatility and flexibility of the business 
do appear to have been eroded by the cutting back 
on product engineering capability, and by (in 
their own words) the "driving away" of ex-
perienced sales representatives. 
(6) there is some evidence that in-plant training 
programs have also been cut back, e.g. in product 
engineering and equipment maintenance. 
The condition of Gulf+Western 
Not counting energy or utility companies, G+W 
is the 28th wealthiest corporation (in terms of as-
sets) in the world, according to Business Week. 
Its most recent (1981) annual report to the stock-
holders begins with the words: "We are pleased 
to report that Gulf+Western Industries, Inc. 
achieved record sales and net earnings per share 
in fiscal 1981—the third consecutive year in 
which operating results have achieved new 
highs." Sales last year were almost $6 billion, and 
net profits (after meeting all expenses) were near-
ly $300 million. The corporation owns 119 dif-
ferent businesses, located throughout the United 
States and in Canada, Japan, Western Europe, 
Central and South America (in 1981, 44 percent 
of G+W's before-tax profits came from their 
foreign operations). 
Instead of using these enormous resources to 
build up the parts of the corporation that most 
needed them in order to become more competi-
tive in their particular markets, G+W has 
systematically disinvfcsted in all of it's basic 
manufacturing operations (the division which 
includes Morse), and reallocated its capital to 
other lines with higher short-term profitability. 
Over the past three years, while overall conglom-
erate-wide net investment (capital expenditures 
less depreciation and depletion) was more than 
$400 million, net investment in the Manufactur-
ing Segment (defined in the annual report as 
"automotive products and components, energy 
products, capital equipment, electrical equip-
ment and control systems, coin-operated amuse-
ment equipment, and a number of other prod-
ucts") was minus $2.3 million. To be sure, some 
of the areas of the corporation receiving new in-
jections of capital involve "manufacturing," 
too, such as No Nonsense panty-hose, Simmons 
Beauty-Rest mattresses, and sugar refining in the 
Dominican Republic. But the most highly capi-
talized segment of Gulf+Western remains its so-
called "Leisure-Time" activities: the companies 
which make movies (Raiders of the Lost Ark, 
Reds), television shows (Mork and Mindy, Hap-
py Days), and which operate entertainment cen-
ters (like Madison Square Garden in New York 
City). In the last year, a lot of G+W's investment 
capital also went into playing the stock market. 
Like other conglomerates, G+W sets a target 
rate of return which each of its subsidiaries is ex-
pected to meet; or risk being dumped. The cur-
rent target rate of 25 percent before taxes and in-
flation are figured in is not in itself so out of 
whack, given the rate of inflation over the last 
three years and the industry-wide average in the 
country as a whole. What is irrational on the part 
of G+W management is their apparent insis-
tence upon earning that target rate of profit in 
every subsidiary in every year, even in a reces-
sion. No one realistically expects to achieve the 
industry-wide long-run average rate of profit 
during the lean years. In fact, the principal or-
ganizational advantage of the conglomerate 
form is supposed to be precisely that it can afford 
to "cross-subsidize" sub-average performance in 
certain years (or parts of the corporation) out of 
the super-profits it makes in other years (or from 
other parts of the company—e.g. from those hit 
movies). Moreover, the achievement of the 
industry-wide average rate of profit (even in the 
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best of times) doesn't come free; it requires 
periodic upgrading of the plant, the purchase of 
adequate new equipment, and so forth. In light 
of its poor showing in this regard, Morse Tool's 
management may quite properly be suspected of 
demanding wage givebacks from the union at the 
present time in order to achieve the target rate of 
profit that it cannot achieve otherwise because 
the parent firm, G+W, will not invest in the 
plant. 
What happens next? 
The evidence from around the country is clear: 
wage givebacks only prop up the jobs of local 
managers and provide extra profits to the parent 
corporation's stockholders. They are hardly ever 
sufficient to finance the rehabilitation of a busi-
ness that has been weakened by disinvestment. 
To turn a shop like Morse around, it will be nec-
essary for someone to undertake significant new 
investment in plant and equipment, to restore 
the business' image with its distributors and final 
customers, to more aggressively seek new mar-
kets, and to increase the opportunities for the 
shop's skilled machinists and engineers to devel-
op new products and new manufacturing pro-
cesses. Of course, I have no way of knowing 
whether Gulf-l-Western is willing to make that 
commitment. 
But it will be a shame if someone doesn't make 
it. The long-run outlook for machine tools and 
parts is basically strong. One need only consider 
the necessity of the auto industry to downsize and 
otherwise completely redesign its cars in the years 
ahead, the construction boom that lies around 
the corner when interest rates finally go down, 
the need for more mass transit and environment-
al clean-up equipment, and the growing indus-
trial interest in robotics and scientific equipment 
connected with the emerging bioengineering rev-
olution. If Morse is to be "on-line," ready to 
take advantage of these expanding opportunities, 
its owners will need to be patient with regard to 
their profit expectations. There has been much 
casual talk in the past year about the success of 
the Japanese in building such a productive and 
expansive industrial system so quickly. An ex-
tremely important part of the Japanese success 
story lies in precisely this willingness of the lead-
ing companies to practice patience as they devel-
op new products and new technologies. Japanese 
companies generally earn considerably lower 
rates of short-term profit than their American 
counterparts. 
In 1981 alone, Gulf-f-Western invested $216 
million in its various operations around the 
world. It would cost less than 5 percent of that 
amount to build a new plant for Morse, to equip 
it with the most modern machinery, and to or-
ganize new in-plant training programs for the 
machinists who would work with the new equip-
ment. 
A business is more than just the building it sits 
in. It is the sum of its plant, machinery, good will 
with its customers and its community, and most 
important of all, the skills and experience of its 
workforce. By that larger definition, Morse is al-
most surely a viable business. I hope you all find 
a way to save it. April 27, 1982 
•i 
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